

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Affiliation Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach

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Abstract: We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. This differs from existing models in both formulation and results: the observed social network is a byproduct of a more expressive strategic interaction, which can more naturally explain the emergence of complex social structures. Within this framework, we present a natural network formation game in which agent utilities are locally defined and that, despite its simplicity, nevertheless produces a rich class of equilibria that exhibit structural properties commonly observed in social networks – such as triadic closure – that have proved elusive in most existing models.

Specifically, we consider a game in which players organize networking events (or *gatherings*) at a cost that grows with the number of attendees. A gathering’s cost is assumed by the organizer but the benefit accrues equally to all attendees: a link is formed between any two players who see each other at more than a certain number r_0 of gatherings per time period, whether at gatherings organized by themselves or by third parties. The graph of connections so obtained is the social network of the model.

We analyze the Nash equilibria of this game for the case in which each player derives a benefit $a > 0$ from all her neighbors in the social network and when the costs are linear, i.e., when the cost of a gathering with ℓ invitees is $b + c\ell$, with $b > 0$ and $c > 0$. For $\gamma = a/cr_0 > 1$ and b sufficiently small, all Nash equilibria have the complete graph as their social network; for $\gamma < 1$ the Nash equilibria correspond to a rich class of social networks, all of which have substantial clustering in the sense that the clustering coefficient is bounded below by the inverse of the average degree. Many observed social network structures occur as Nash equilibria of this model. In particular, for any degree sequence with finite mean, and not too many vertices of degree one or two, we can construct a Nash equilibrium producing a social network with the given degree sequence.

We also briefly discuss generalizations of this model to more complex utility functions and processes by which the resulting social network is formed.

Keywords: Network formation; Nash equilibria; triadic closure; power law degree.

1 Introduction

In the past decade there has been increasing interest in complex social networks that arise in both online and offline contexts. Empirical studies have found these networks to share many properties, most notably small diameter, heavy-tailed

degree distributions, and substantial clustering. In light of these observations, theoretical work has focused on explaining *how* and *why* such features appear. While many of these properties have been modeled probabilistically, it is less well understood why they arise as outcomes of strategic behavior. To this end, we present a new class of game-theoretic models that generate networks

⁴This work was done while JD and BL were interns at Microsoft Research New England.

with many commonly-observed structural properties which have proved elusive in existing strategic models.

Probabilistic approaches to modeling network formation include static random graph models (such as the classic random graph model [5] and the configuration model [22]) and dynamic random graph models (such as the preferential attachment model [3] and its many variants). Many observed properties of social networks have been captured in such models: small diameter is easy to achieve (though often not easy to prove) by the inclusion of randomness [6]; heavy-tailed degree distributions arise from many preferential attachment models [7]; and clustering has been established in several random dynamic models such as the copying [19] and affiliation [20] models. On the other hand, these models do not take into account individual incentives in the development of connections, and therefore do not provide an understanding of how networks arise from individual choices. For this, a game-theoretic approach is better suited.

Game-theoretic approaches to network formation go back to the work of Boorman [8], Aumann and Myerson [1], and Myerson [23]. For a beautiful treatment, see the recent books by Goyal [15], Jackson [16], and Easley and Kleinberg [12]. Generally speaking, the strategic models studied in the literature share a common high-level description: agents are assumed to derive some benefit from a social network, but connections come at a cost (be it in the form of effort, money, or otherwise). Agents thus strategically choose which connections to maintain, either unilaterally or in pairs, and then reap the benefits of the resulting network. One would then predict that observed social networks correspond to the equilibria of the resulting game. Although there has been some very thoughtful and insightful work on strategic models of network formation (see [15], [16], and [12], and references therein), the social networks so obtained at equilibrium tend to have rather limited architectures. In particular, they tend not to exhibit many structural properties associated with observed social networks, such as triadic closure.

In this paper, we present a new class of game-

Triadic closure refers to the tendency for a node's neighbours to connect to each other.

theoretic models for network formation, which to our knowledge are qualitatively different, in both formulation and results, from previous models. Our approach is motivated by the sociological notion of *affiliation networks* due to Breiger [10, 11]. An affiliation network is a bipartite graph where the nodes of one type are the players, and the nodes of the other type are gatherings or groups with which the players can be affiliated. One can also view an affiliation network as a hypergraph over players, with each hyperedge representing a single group. This hypergraph can then be used to induce a network on the set of players by linking any two that are members of at least one common group.

We build upon the affiliation network model in two ways. First, we take a game-theoretic approach whereby each affiliation group is sponsored by an agent (at a cost), while the benefits from the resulting network are derived by all players (allowing some individuals to hitchhike on the efforts of others). Second, we change the induced network so that coaffiliation does not automatically guarantee a connection: agents must jointly participate in many gatherings in order to form a link. More concretely, we study a model in which agents hold social gatherings, where a gathering with ℓ invitees has cost $b + c\ell$ for $b, c > 0$. Agents who see each other at more than r_0 gatherings become connected, for some $r_0 \in \mathbb{N}$, and these connections form the observed social network. Each player then receives a benefit $a > 0$ for each of their neighbors in the network.

Formulated more abstractly, our paradigm is that the actions of the players in a network formation game are not necessarily directly associated with the formation of edges, but rather take place in an underlying strategy space. The resulting network is determined by an interplay of these actions which is not necessarily just a union of edges chosen by the players. We will assume that the cost C_v for player v is a function of her strategy \mathcal{P}_v and the strategic choices of all agents imply a network $G = G(\{\mathcal{P}_v\}_{v \in V})$. The benefit \mathcal{B}_v of agent v is then a function only of this social network (as opposed to the full strategy space), leading to a utility

$$\mathcal{U}_v = \mathcal{B}_v(G) - C_v(\mathcal{P}_v)$$

for player v . Some classes of examples for benefit functions \mathcal{B}_v include distance-based benefits, such




Figure 1: A typical connected component of a network at equilibrium, where cliques (circled for emphasis) are connected arbitrarily by local bridges and/or small overlapping subgroups.

as those introduced by Bloch and Jackson [4], as well as benefits that do not decay with distance, such as those as studied by Bala and Goyal [2].

Results

Returning to our particular example of a social event game, we study the equilibria of behaviour as a function of parameter $\gamma = a/cr_0$. When $\gamma > 1$ and b is sufficiently small, all equilibria result in the complete graph (Fact 4.1). On the other hand, for $\gamma < 1$, there is a much richer class of equilibria that all demonstrate a high degree of triadic closure. Specifically, the induced subgraph of the ball of radius 1 centered at any vertex v can be written as a union of triangles and at most one additional edge (Theorem 4.3). From this we can derive tight lower bounds on the clustering coefficient of any resulting social network in terms of the average degree; see Theorem 4.7. It is notable that clustering arises endogenously in sparse graphs, even though an agent's benefit from the network depends only on her degree.

We then consider the larger structural properties of networks supportable at equilibrium. We find that such networks are built up from cliques whose minimal size depends on parameter γ ; loosely speaking, we find that larger cliques are supportable for wider ranges of parameters (Fact 4.2). Such cliques can be thought of as tightly-knit groups, which can then be loosely connected into arbitrary social structures. More precisely, given a graph H on n vertices with degrees d_1, \dots, d_n , and complete graphs H_1, \dots, H_n with $|H_i| \geq \min\{d_i, 3\}$, we can construct a supportable social network in which the vertices of H are replaced

by the cliques $\{H_i\}$ and the edges of H represent local bridges between those communities. Such a structure can also be supported by overlapping communities, as long as the non-overlapping regions are sufficiently large. See Figure 1, Fact 4.5, and Remark 4.1. Moreover, such structures allow us to support connected networks with any given heavy-tailed degree distribution, as in Theorem 5.1. Thus, while our model is selective in that it supports only highly clustered networks, it is not so restrictive as to disallow interesting structures in the resulting graphs.

Related Work

The notion of affiliation networks was introduced by Breiger [10, 11] and expanded upon by McPherson [21]; see also Wasserman and Faust [24] and references therein. A theoretical treatment of this model was given by Lattanzi and Sivakumar [20], who showed that a variant of the copy model of random network growth applied to affiliation networks leads to graphs that exhibit heavy-tailed degree distributions, low diameter, and edge densification. This work differs from our results in that it does not consider strategic issues.

Game-theoretic models of network formation go back to Boorman [8] and Myerson [23]. Very roughly speaking, most strategic models studied in the literature can be divided into two classes: those in which links are formed by unilateral decisions, and those in which decisions are made pairwise. In the case of unilateral decisions, the appropriate notion of stability is Nash equilibrium. Bala and Goyal [2] present models of unilateral link formation where a player's benefit is the size of the reachable component, either via directed or undirected edges. In the former case, the efficient equilibria architectures are cycles or empty networks; in the latter, the resulting equilibria are trees. Fabrikant et. al. [13] consider a more complex utility model motivated by routing costs, and obtain equilibria as trees with heavy-tailed degree distributions.

In the case that mutual consent is required to form a link, the natural notion of stability is that of pairwise stability: no individual player wants to sever a link and no pair of players wants to add a

A local bridge is an edge whose endpoints do not share a common neighbour.

link between them. Many such models of network formation have been studied in recent years. The distance-based utility model of Bloch and Jackson [4], as well as variants of the model due to Fabrikant et. al. [14], have either the complete graph or stars as the unique resulting efficient networks. The coauthor model of Jackson and Wolinsky [18] has disconnected cliques as its efficient resulting network, while the so-called island connection model due to Jackson and Rogers [17] generates cliques connected by single edges.

Recently, Brautbar and Kearns [9] considered a game-theoretic model of network formation in which the utility of each node is determined by its clustering coefficient in the resulting network. Their model is similar to ours in that it aims at exploring the high degree of clustering apparent in social networks. The primary difference is that their model explicitly incentivizes agents to form links in order to achieve high clustering, whereas clustering in our model arises from the agents' ability to influence the network via gatherings rather than by directly purchasing connections.

2 A Model of Social Effort

Let V be a community of rational agents. We wish to describe a network formation game through which the agents form connections. We begin by describing the strategy space. A *gathering* is a subset $P \subset V$ of agents, along with a corresponding *rate* $r > 0$. A strategy for an agent $v \in V$ is a sequence of gatherings $\mathcal{P}_v = \{P_{v,1}, \dots, P_{v,k_v}\}$ with corresponding rates $r_{v,1}, \dots, r_{v,k_v}$. Here k_v is the number of gatherings initiated by v . We will refer to a strategy profile $\mathcal{P} = \{(\mathcal{P}_v, r_v) : v \in V\}$ as a *gathering configuration*. Fixing a gathering configuration and individuals $u, v \in V$, the *meeting rate supported* by $w \in V$ between u and v is

$$M_{u,v}^w = \sum_{i \in [k_w]} r_{w,i} \mathbf{1}_{\{u,v \in P_{w,i}\}}.$$

Thus $M_{u,v}^w$ denotes the rate at which u and v are both present in a gathering held by w . The *meeting rate* $M_{u,v}$ is the total rate of the gatherings that both u and v attend. That is,

$$M_{u,v} = \sum_{w \in V} M_{u,v}^w. \quad (1)$$

We say that agents u and v are *connected* if their meeting rate is at least some threshold r_0 . Without loss of generality we scale values so that $r_0 = 1$. We write N_v for the set of individuals connected to v . That is,

$$N_v = \{u \neq v : M_{u,v} \geq 1\}. \quad (2)$$

This notion of connectedness is symmetric, so that $u \in N_v$ if and only if $v \in N_u$.

Utility Model

We now describe the utilities in our network formation game. We assume that an agent obtains a benefit $a > 0$ for each agent to which he is connected. Also, the cost for agent v to hold gatherings $P_{v,1}, \dots, P_{v,k_v}$ at rates $r_{v,1}, \dots, r_{v,k_v}$ is

$$\mathcal{C}_v(\mathcal{P}_v) = \sum_{i \in [k_v]} r_{v,i} (c(|P_{v,i} \setminus \{v\}|) + b) \quad (3)$$

where $c > 0$ counts the cost of a gathering per agent (excluding v herself) and $b > 0$ counts the initial fixed cost of a gathering. Altogether, given gathering configuration \mathcal{P} , the utility of agent v is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{U}_v &= a|N_v| - \mathcal{C}_v(\mathcal{P}_v) \\ &= a|N_v| - \sum_{i \in [k_v]} r_{v,i} (c|P_{v,i} \setminus \{v\}| + b). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

We will write $\gamma = \frac{a}{c}$ throughout.

Stability

We say a gathering configuration is *stable* if it forms a Nash equilibrium in the network formation game. A gathering configuration naturally defines a network, where we place an edge between u and v precisely when $u \in N_v$. We say that this network of connections is *supported* by gathering configuration \mathcal{P} . We say that a graph is *supportable* if there exists at least one stable gathering configuration that supports it.

3 Characterization of Stable Networks

We now wish to characterize networks that arise as Nash equilibria of our network formation game. We begin by considering the optimal response of an agent v given the strategy profile of the other

Note that b is multiplied by the rate of the associated gathering, so that we think of b as a cost per *instance* of a gathering.

agents. We say that the gathering strategy \mathcal{P}_v realizes invitation rates $\mathcal{M}_v = \{m_{v,u}^v : u \neq v\}$ if $M_{v,u}^v = m_{v,u}^v$ for all $u \neq v$. A key ingredient in analyzing optimal responses for v is to show how to realize a given \mathcal{M}^v with a gathering configuration of minimal cost.

Theorem 3.1. *Given $\mathcal{M}^v = \{m_{v,u}^v : u \neq v\}$, any optimal strategy \mathcal{P}_v realizing \mathcal{M}^v satisfies*

$$\sum_{i \in [k_v]} r_{v,i} = \max_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v. \quad (5)$$

Proof. We first demonstrate the existence of a strategy that realizes \mathcal{M}^v and satisfies (5). Arrange all the strictly positive $m_{v,u}^v$'s in a decreasing order such that $m_{v,v_1}^v \geq \dots \geq m_{v,v_\ell}^v > 0$. Let $P_{v,i} = \{v, v_1, \dots, v_i\}$ for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$. We define the gathering strategy $\mathcal{P}_v^{\text{nest}}$ to be the collection of gatherings $\{P_{v,1}, \dots, P_{v,\ell}\}$ at corresponding rates

$$r_{v,i} = m_{v,v_i}^v - m_{v,v_{i+1}}^v \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, \ell,$$

where we used the convention $m_{v,v_{\ell+1}}^v = 0$. It is straightforward to verify that the strategy $\mathcal{P}_v^{\text{nest}}$ realizes \mathcal{M}^v and also satisfies (5) (note that in this case $k_v = \ell$).

Now, let \mathcal{P}_v be an arbitrary strategy that realizes \mathcal{M}^v but violates (5). Observe that \mathcal{P}_v must satisfy $\sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} \geq \max_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v$. Then, assuming (5) is violated, we have $\sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} > \max_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v$. Therefore, we conclude that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_v(\mathcal{P}_v) &= \sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} (c|P_{v,i}| + b) \\ &= b \sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} + c \sum_{i=1}^{k_v} \sum_{u \neq v} r_{v,i} \mathbf{1}_{\{u \in P_{v,i}\}} \\ &= b \sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} + c \sum_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v \\ &> b \max_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v + c \sum_{u \neq v} m_{v,u}^v \\ &= \mathcal{C}_v(\mathcal{P}_v^{\text{nest}}). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Corollary 3.2. *Any stable strategy profile \mathcal{P} satisfies that $\sum_{i=1}^{k_v} r_{v,i} = \max_{u \neq v} M_{v,u}^v$ for $v \in V$.*

Corollary 3.3. *If \mathcal{P} is a stable gathering configuration and $u \in \arg \max_{u \neq v} \{M_{v,u}^v\}$ then $u \in P_{v,i}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k_v$.*

We next aim at a set of criteria for a gathering configuration \mathcal{P} to be stable. Given agent v and strategies $\mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{P}_v$ of the other agents, we define $E_{v,u} = 1 - \sum_{w \neq v} M_{v,u}^w$. We think of $E_{v,u}$ as the minimal rate at which v should invite u in order to create a connection. Define

$$T_v = \{u \in V : 0 < E_{v,u} < \gamma\}.$$

Finally, given a gathering profile \mathcal{P}_v for agent v , let $I_v = \{u \in V : M_{v,u}^v > 0\}$ denote the set of invitees for v .

Theorem 3.4. *If \mathcal{P} is a stable gathering configuration, then, for all $v \in V$,*

$$I_v \subseteq T_v, \quad M_{v,u}^v = E_{v,u}, \quad \text{and} \quad E_{v,u} < E_{v,w} \quad (6)$$

for all $u \in I_v$ and $w \in T_v \setminus I_v$.

Proof. We demonstrate the required conditions in order. Keep in mind that the quantities $E_{v,u}$ completely capture the impact of a given strategy \mathcal{P}_v on the utility of v . First of all, v should hold gatherings that only include agents $u \in T_v$, since for any other agent the marginal utility of supporting the connection is negative. Also, there is no point for v to realize an invitation rate $M_{v,u}^v > E_{v,u}$ for any agent u , since v and u will be connected as long as $M_{v,u}^v = E_{v,u}$ and making $M_{v,u}^v$ larger will only cost more to v . Similarly, there is no point to make $0 < M_{v,u}^v < E_{v,u}$, since it will incur a cost but offers no benefit. Furthermore, for $x, y \in T_v$ such that $E_{v,x} \geq E_{v,y}$, if v profits by making a connection with x , it must profit by doing so with y . Note that it may not be optimal for v to support connections with *all* agents in T_v , due to the fixed cost component b in the utility model. \square

Corollary 3.5. *In any stable gathering configuration, $M_{v,u}^v < \gamma$ for all $u, v \in V$, and $M_{v,u}^v > 0$ implies $u \in N_v$.*

4 Properties of Supportable Networks

We now wish to analyze the properties of networks that are supportable by stable gathering configurations. We begin by considering simple examples, in order to build some intuition for the structures that can arise in stable networks. We then consider the clustering coefficient and average degree of supportable networks.







 $\gamma > 1/4$	 $\gamma > 1/3$	 $1/3 < \gamma < 1$
 $1/2 \leq \gamma < 1$	 $1/2 \leq \gamma < 1$	 Not supportable

Table 1: Sample connection graphs, with the range of parameter γ in which they are supportable as strong subgraphs.

4.1 Examples

In this section we give some simple examples of network structures, along with necessary conditions for them to be supportable. We begin by noting that if $\gamma > 1$ and b is sufficiently small, then the complete graph is the only supportable graph.

Fact 4.1. *If $\gamma > 1$ and $b < c(\gamma - 1)$ then K_n is the unique supportable graph.*

Given the above result, we will focus on the case $\gamma < 1$. In what follows we will also suppose that $b = 0^+$ is set to be arbitrarily small.

We say that H is a *strong subgraph* of network G if H is an induced subgraph of G , and moreover, for each $u, v \in H$, $N_u \cap N_v \subseteq H$. We consider several examples of small graphs and study when they can be strong subgraphs of a supportable graph.

Fact 4.2. *For $\ell \geq 2$, graph K_ℓ can be a strong subgraph of a supportable network if and only if $\gamma > \frac{1}{\ell}$.*

An important special case is an edge (u, v) with $N_u \cap N_v = \emptyset$, which we call a *local bridge*. We show that each node is incident with at most one local bridge in a supportable network.

Theorem 4.3. *A supportable graph G can contain K_2 as a strong subgraph only if $\gamma > 1/2$. Moreover, each node can be contained in at most one such subgraph.*

Proof. The condition on γ follows from Fact 4.2. Next suppose for contradiction that G is supported by a stable invitation graph and node u

is connected to multiple agents with whom he shares no common neighbours. Choose $x \in \arg \max\{M_{u,x}^u\}$. Then, in particular, there is some $v \neq x$ such that $v \in N_u$ and u and v do not share any common neighbours. Corollary 3.3 then implies that $x \in P_{u,i}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k_u$, and in particular for each i in which $v \in P_{u,i}$. We therefore have $E_{v,x} \leq 1 - M_{u,v}^u \leq M_{v,u}^v = E_{v,u}$, which contradicts Theorem 3.4. \square

Corollary 4.4. *The star graph with more than 1 leaf is not supportable.*

For any $k > p \geq 1$, we will write $H_{k,p}$ for the graph on $2k - p$ vertices which consists of two k -cliques which share p vertices in common. Theorem 4.3 can be re-interpreted as demonstrating that graph $H_{2,1}$ is not supportable. We next demonstrate that, for any k , $H_{k,p}$ is supportable if $k - p$ is not too small (depending on γ).

Fact 4.5. *For $k > 2$, a supportable graph can contain $H_{k,1}$ as a strong subgraph if and only if $\gamma > 1/k$. For $p > 1$ and $k > p + 1$, a supportable graph can contain $H_{k,p}$ as a strong subgraph if $\gamma > 1/(k - p)$.*

Remark 4.1. Fact 4.5 generalizes to allow arbitrarily many cliques of varying sizes to be joined together at single vertices (or by bridges if $\gamma > 1/2$) or overlap with sufficiently small intersections. It is therefore possible to build networks in which tightly-knit communities (i.e. cliques) are joined by small intersections and/or loose inter-community connections.

We have shown that cliques can be joined at a single vertex without altering the threshold at which they are supportable. We conclude our list of examples by observing that cliques joined at multiple vertices can have a different supportability threshold on γ (and, in particular, are harder to support as strong subgraphs).

Theorem 4.6. *Graph $H_{3,2}$ is supportable if and only if $\gamma > 1/2$.*

4.2 Clustering in Supportable Networks

One phenomenon observed in social community is that two people with a common neighbor tend to be connected with each other. So, one expects to see many triangles in the connection graph. A

common measure of clustering is the *clustering coefficient* of graph G , defined as

$$\mathcal{E}(G) = \frac{1}{|V_2|} \sum_{v \in V_2} \frac{N_{v,\Delta}}{\binom{d_v}{2}}, \quad (7)$$

where d_v is the degree of v , $N_{v,\Delta}$ is the number of triangles to which v belongs, and V_2 is the set of vertices of degree at least 2. That is to say, if we pick a random node in the graph of degree at least 2 and pick two random neighbors of this node, the probability that these 3 nodes form a triangle is $\mathcal{E}(G)$. Additionally, we write \bar{d}_G for the average degree of G .

Theorem 4.7. *Any connected supportable connection graph G satisfies $\mathcal{E}(G) \geq 1/(2\bar{d}_G)$.*

Remark 4.2. For any graph G with minimal degree 2, we have $\mathcal{E}(G) \geq 1/\bar{d}_G$.

Proof. Let $W = \{v \in V : d_v \geq 2\}$. For every $v \in W$, Theorem 4.3 asserts that v can have at most one friend u such that $N_v \cap N_u = \emptyset$. This implies that $N_{v,\Delta} \geq \frac{d_v-1}{2}$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(G) &\geq \frac{1}{|W|} \sum_{v \in W} \frac{(d_v-1)/2}{\binom{d_v}{2}} \\ &= \frac{1}{|W|} \sum_{v \in W} \frac{1}{d_v} \\ &\geq \frac{1}{\bar{d}_{G,W}}, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where $\bar{d}_{G,W}$ is the average degree over set W and the last transition uses the convexity of the function $f(x) = 1/x$ for $x > 0$.

Note that in a connected supportable graph, any degree 1 vertex has to be connected to a vertex of degree at least 2. On the other hand, Theorem 4.3 implies that any vertex can be connected to at most one vertex of degree 1. Altogether, we see that $|V \setminus W| \leq |V|/2$. Therefore, we have $\bar{d}_G \geq \bar{d}_{G,W}/2$. Combined with (8), the required bound follows. \square

Note that our bound on the clustering coefficient is tight, up to a constant depending on γ .

Theorem 4.8. *Suppose $1/k < \gamma < 1 - 1/k$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Then there exist supportable connection graphs for which $\mathcal{E}(G) \leq \frac{(1+o(1))(k-2)}{\bar{d}_G-1}$.*

Proof. Let H be a random d -regular k -hypergraph on n nodes. Write $m = dn/k$, and denote by $\mathcal{X} = \{X_1, \dots, X_m\}$ the random hyperedges in H . Define

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{Y} &= \{X_i : |X_i \cap X_j| \geq 2 \text{ for some } i \neq j\} \cup \\ &\cup \{X_i : X_i \text{ is in a cycle of length at most } 4\}. \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to compute that for all $i \in [m]$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(X_i \in \mathcal{Y}) &\leq m \binom{k}{n}^2 + \binom{m}{2} \binom{k^2}{n}^3 + \binom{m}{3} \binom{k^2}{n}^4 \\ &= o(1). \end{aligned}$$

It follows that with high probability $|\mathcal{Y}| = o(m)$. Let H' be the hypergraph with edge set $\mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{Y}$. We now construct a gathering configuration in the following way: for each hyperedge $A \in H$, let everyone in A host a gathering inviting everyone else in A with rate $1/k$. We next demonstrate that this configuration is stable. Note that each hyperedge generates a clique with meeting rate 1, and since $\gamma > 1/k$ no agent is motivated to reduce these meeting rates. For two agents who are not in any same hyperedge, their meeting rate is at most $1/k$ since the girth of H' is at least 5. Since $\gamma < 1 - \frac{1}{k}$, no agent is motivated to make an additional connection since it would require an invitation rate $1 - 1/k > \gamma$. This completes the verification of stability.

Recalling that $|\mathcal{Y}| = o(m)$, we see that every vertex $v \in G$ except for $o(n)$ vertices is in d cliques of size k , where these cliques are disjoint except for the intersection at v . That is to say, for a $(1 - o(1))$ fraction of the vertices, we have $d_v(G) = (k-1)d$ and $N_{v,\Delta}(G) = d \binom{k-1}{2}$. Therefore, we conclude that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(G) &\geq (1+o(1))(k-2)/((k-1)d-1) \\ &\geq (1+o(1))(k-2)/(\bar{d}_G-1). \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

4.3 Gathering Size and Network Sparsity

We note that our network formation model does not impose any limits on the size of the gatherings that agents can support. Indeed, it is possible for a single agent to hold a gathering for all agents in the network. However, we note that such large gatherings are not necessary to obtain a lower bound on clustering (Theorem 4.7) or support interesting degree distributions (see Section 5). Thus, even though our strategy space allows

for very large gatherings, we obtain equilibria in which each agent holds only small gatherings.

One could argue that configurations with small gatherings are natural, since in many settings it seems unlikely that a single agent would unilaterally support a large fraction of an entire social network. Given that such small-gathering configurations arise as equilibria in our model, we turn to studying their properties.

Recall that $I_v = \{u \in V : M_{v,u}^v > 0\}$ is the set of individuals invited to gatherings held by v . We say that a connection graph is K -supportable if it is supportable by a gathering configuration in which $|I_v| \leq K$ for each agent v . We give an upper bound on the average degree of K -supportable connection networks. Combined with Theorem 4.7, it yields a lower bound of $1/(2\gamma K(K+1))$ on clustering coefficient for any K -supportable connected graph.

Theorem 4.9. *Any K -supportable connection graph G satisfies $\bar{d}_G \leq \gamma K(K+1)$.*

Proof. For the proof, we consider the corresponding weighted connection graph \tilde{G} with edge weight $w_{u,v} = M_{u,v}$. It is clear from our definition that $\bar{d}_G \leq \bar{d}_{\tilde{G}}$. Note that in every stable party configuration, each agent v can only invite at most K people with rate at most γ . Therefore, its invitation can contribute at most $\gamma K(K+1)$ to the total degree of \tilde{G} . Summing over all the agents, we get $\bar{d}_{\tilde{G}} \leq \gamma K(K+1)$. \square

We also note that the average degree of network G can indeed approach the bound of γK^2 .

Theorem 4.10. *Suppose that $K > \lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor + 1$. There exists a K -supportable connection graph such that $\bar{d}_G = (1 - o(1))K(K+1)/(\lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor + 1)$.*

5 Supportable Degree Sequences

We show in this subsection that for a rich family of degree sequences, there exists a corresponding supportable connection network. In particular, we demonstrate that we can support a connected graph of power law degree with finite mean. Thus, while our class of equilibria is selective in that supportable networks must have a high degree of clustering, it does not limit supportable networks to be of a simple, symmetric form.

Theorem 5.1. *Fix $1/2 < \gamma < 2/3$. Let $D = \{d_1, \dots, d_n\} \in [n]^n$ be a degree sequence such that*

1. *There exists $K \in \mathbb{N}$ such that*

$$|\{i \in [n] : 2 \leq d_i \leq K\}| \geq \sum_{i \in [n]} d_i \mathbf{1}_{\{d_i > K\}}.$$

2. $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = 2\}| \leq \sum_{i \in [n]} (d_i - 3) \mathbf{1}_{\{d_i \geq 6\}}.$

3. $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = 1\}| \leq \frac{1}{3} |\{i \in [n] : d_i \geq 4\}|.$
Then for some constant $C_K \geq 0$ depending on K , there exists a connected $(K+3)$ -supportable graph G of degree sequence $D' = \{d'_1, \dots, d'_n\}$ such that the ℓ_1 shift satisfies

$$\|D - D'\|_{\ell_1} = \sum_{i \in [n]} |d_i - d'_i| \leq C_K.$$

Proof. Define $A = \{i \in [n] : d_i \leq K\}$ and $B = \{i \in [n] : d_i > K\}$. Our construction consists of the following several steps. Keep in mind that we can perturb the degree sequence by some amount depending on K and we use this fact throughout the proof. For simplicity, we first state the construction assuming there are no degree 1 vertices at all, and we will address this issue later. After the construction, we will discuss the connectedness and stability of the graph.

Step 1: Handling degree-2 vertices. By Assumption (2), we can effectively remove degree-2 vertices by adding triangles to high-degree nodes. Precisely, we repeat the following procedure. Pick $u, v \in A$ of degree 2 and $w = \arg \max_{x \in A \cup B} d_x$. Let u hold gatherings $\{v, w\}$ and v hold gatherings $\{u, w\}$, both at rate $1/2$. This supports a stable triangle among $\{u, v, w\}$. Remove u, v from A and update d_w to $d_w - 2$. We stop the process when there is at most 1 degree 2 vertex left, at which point we perturb its degree a bit and make it 3. Note that Assumption (1) is preserved.

Step 2: Handling high-degree vertices. Step 1 allows us to assume that $\min_i d_i \geq 3$. In this step, we further reduce to the case when $3 \leq d_i \leq K+3$ for all i . We can find a degree sequence D^* with $\|D^* - D\|_{\ell_1} \leq K^2$ such that Assumption (1) is preserved and $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = k\}|$ is a multiple of k for all $3 \leq k \leq K$. We then repeatedly match high degree vertices while preserving Assumptions (1). If there is $v \in B$ such that $d_v \geq K+3$, by Assumption (1) there exist k vertices of degree k in A for some $3 \leq k \leq K$. Then,

we will form a clique containing these k vertices together with v as follows: each of these k vertices holds a gathering inviting v and all the other $k - 1$ vertices at rate $1/k$. We now remove these k vertices from A and update d_v as $d_v - k$. We remark that the number of vertices consumed from set A is k and the total degree consumed from B is exactly k and therefore Assumption (1) is preserved. This justifies that we can repeat this process until $\max_v d_v \leq K + 3$.

Step 3: Constructing regular graphs of low degree. We can now assume $3 \leq d_i \leq K + 3$ for all i . For every $3 \leq k \leq K + 3$, we would like to construct a connected graph that contains all the vertices of degree k . Denote by m_k the number of vertices of degree k . We need to use the fact that for every k , there exists a connected k -regular graph H on m vertices of girth at least 5, where $m \geq n_k$ for some $n_k \in \mathbb{N}$ depending only on k .

Case 1: $m_k \leq kn_k$. We first group all the vertices in blocks of size $(k + 1)$ and for each block we support a clique such that each agent holds a gathering for his block with rate $1/(k + 1)$. It remains to make the graph connected. To this end, we pick two vertices u_j, v_j from the j -th clique for every j . Now we add edges of form (u_j, v_{j+1}) for every j , where u_j and v_{j+1} both hold gatherings for each other with rate $1/2$. This graph is supportable and connected and furthermore, the ℓ_1 shift of the degree sequence is at most $2n_k$.

Case 2: $m_k \geq kn_k$. In this case, take a connected k -regular graph H on m_k/k vertices of girth at least 5. We construct our connection graph based on H . Basically, we replace each node of H by a clique of size k where each node in the clique holds a gathering for the whole clique with rate $1/k$. Then, for every edge in H , we take a vertex from each of the two cliques corresponding to the nodes of this edge, and add an edge between this two vertices by letting them invite each other with rate $1/2$. We do this in a way such that we add exactly one edge to every vertex (using the fact that H is k -regular). Since the girth of H is at least 5, we see that in our construction, those who are not connected have meeting rate at most $1/k \leq 1/3$. Recalling $\gamma < 2/3$, we verify that this construction is stable.

Step 4: Connecting graph components. It remains to connect these (roughly) k -regular graphs

constructed in Step 3. We would like to add edges between these graphs (to connect them), but we must guarantee that no vertex is involved in 2 such bridges (including those used in Step 3). For each “regular” graph constructed in Case 1 in the previous step, it is clear that we can choose two vertices such that there are no bridges associated with them. For graphs constructed in Case 2, since the underlying graph H contains cycles, we can break a bridge between two vertices (without affecting the connectedness). In either case, we get two vertices for each such graph with no bridges. Label these vertices as v_k, u_k for $3 \leq k \leq K + 3$ and add edges of the form (v_k, u_{k+1}) by letting them invite each other at rate $1/2$. We now obtain a connected graph and it is stable.

Attaching degree-1 vertices. We now turn to dealing with degree 1 vertices. Basically, up to the availability of degree 1 vertices, we want to modify our construction slightly such we are allowed to attach degree 1 vertices. This modification happens in Steps 2 and 3.

Suppose now we have at least K degree 1 vertices. In Step 2, whenever we construct a clique of size k , we can attach degree 1 vertices to the clique we added. More precisely, instead of taking k vertices of degree k from A , we now take $k - 1$ vertices of degree k from A and denote them by v_1, \dots, v_{k-1} . We then form a clique for $\{v_1, \dots, v_{k-1}\}$ by having each v_i holds a gathering for the clique at rate $1/(k - 1)$. We then update d_v to $d_v - (k - 1)$. If $k \geq 4$, we can now attach a vertex of degree 1 to each v_i where both this newly added vertex and v_i invite each other at rate $1/2$. Remove $\{v_1, \dots, v_{k-1}\}$ and these attached degree 1 vertices from A . We see that Assumptions (1) and (3) are preserved.

In Step (3), we consider every integer k such that $4 \leq k \leq K + 3$. If $m_k \leq kn_k$, we can attach a degree 1 vertex to every vertex in the graph that does not have a bridge (of which there are at least $m_k - 2n_k \geq \frac{m_k}{3}$) and this perturbs the degree of at most m_k vertices by 1. If $m_k > kn_k$, we consider the k -regular connection graph we constructed. We see that we can remove up to $|H|(k - 2)/2$ bridges and the graph will remain connected. Now, for each bridge that is broken, we can attach a degree 1 vertex to each end of this bridge using mutual invitation rate $1/2$. This implies that we can

add as many as $(k-2)|H| = \frac{k-1}{k}m_k \geq \frac{m_k}{3}$ degree 1 vertices in this step. This completes the consideration of degree 1 vertices.

We are done with the construction. It is easy to see from our 4 steps that the total ℓ_1 shift of the degree sequence is bounded by some $C_K > 0$ depending only on K . In Step 1 and 2, we removed many low degree vertices and every low degree vertex is connected to some vertex which remains. In Step 3 and 4, we constructed a connected graph out of all the remaining vertices. This implies that the final connection graph is connected. Note also that at each step of the construction, those vertices who remain have not held any gathering, so there is no interplay between steps that would affect the stability of the construction. That is to say, the stability of each step (as demonstrated above) implies the stability of the whole construction. Finally, the total number of people an agent invites is bounded by $K + 3$. This completes the proof. \square

Corollary 5.2. Fix $1/2 < \gamma < 2/3$. Let $D = \{d_1, \dots, d_n\} \in [n]^n$ be a degree sequence such that

- $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = k\}| = \lfloor cnk^{-\alpha} \rfloor$, for some constant $c > 0$ and $\alpha > 2$.
- $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = 2\}| \leq \sum_{i \in [n]} (d_i - 3)\mathbf{1}_{\{d_i \geq 6\}}$.
- $|\{i \in [n] : d_i = 1\}| \leq \frac{1}{3}|\{i \in [n] : d_i \geq 4\}|$.

Then, there exist connected K -supportable graphs of degree sequence $D' = \{d'_1, \dots, d'_n\}$ such that $\|D - D'\|_{\ell_1} = \sum_{i \in [n]} |d_i - d'_i| \leq C_\alpha$, where $K, C_\alpha > 0$ depend only on α .

Proof. We only need to verify Assumption (1) in Theorem 5.1. For power law degree with $\alpha > 2$, the average degree is finite and thus Assumption (1) holds for some K_α depending on α . Applying Theorem 5.1 completes the proof. \square

Remark 5.1. We note that if we impose a lower bound of d on the minimal degree, we can apply a similar construction and yield a relaxed condition on γ ; namely, that $1/2 < \gamma < 1 - \frac{1}{d}$.

6 Future Directions

The strategic model of affiliation networks presented herein represents a step toward the larger goal of obtaining a game-theoretic understanding of the structural properties of social networks. As

such, there are many natural extensions to consider and questions to pose.

In this work we have focused on the static properties of networks at equilibrium. A natural next step is to determine which equilibria are likely to arise as outcomes when a network evolves over time. As a particular example, one might consider a growth model in which new agents arrive and initiate certain gatherings, after which point the network attempts to stabilize via best-response dynamics. What are the properties of networks that form according to such a process? Such an analysis is particularly relevant in light of the rich class of networks that can arise at equilibrium; a dynamic process that differentiates between equilibria would contribute to the predictive power of our model.

Our model extends easily to allow heterogeneity between agents. In particular, one could allow connection benefits and gathering costs to vary between individuals (or pairs of individuals). Such a generalization could, for example, distinguish agents according to a measure of sociability. One could also model the effects of gathering size by having the meeting rate of individuals depend on the sizes of the gatherings that they co-attend. This could be used to model the fact that agents are less likely to build a relationship at a large gala than at an intimate dinner party.

We have focused on the solution concept of Nash equilibrium, where deviations are assumed to occur unilaterally. One could extend this to allow for multiple agents to deviate jointly. For example, one might imagine a bargaining dynamics by which agents jointly decide to sponsor social groups, lowering the barriers to link formation. This could be viewed as an extension of Nash Bargaining to groups of agents. Alternatively, one might impose a cost on attending gatherings, which adds a cooperative element to the game: agents need not only propose gatherings, but also choose whether or not to accept invitations. Such a model harkens to the notion of pairwise stability that has been studied extensively in the strategic network formation literature.

Appendix A

Proof of Fact 4.1. We first note that K_n is supportable by a stable gathering configuration in

which an agent v holds gathering $P = V$ with rate 1. Next suppose $G = (V, E)$ and there exist $u, v \in V$ with $(u, v) \notin E$. The utility of node u would increase by at least $a - c - b$ if he were to hold a gathering for v with rate 1, which is strictly positive if $b < c(\gamma - 1)$. Thus G is not supportable. \square

Proof of Fact 4.2. Let H be a strongly connected subgraph of size ℓ . If $\gamma \leq \frac{1}{\ell}$, then by Corollary 3.5 $M_{v,u}^v < \frac{1}{\ell}$ for all $u, v \in H$. Thus, it must be that $M_{v,u} \leq \sum_{w \in V} M_{u,v}^w < \ell \cdot \frac{1}{\ell} = 1$ for all $u, v \in H$. Thus $(u, v) \notin H$, and hence K_ℓ is not supportable. On the other hand, if $\gamma > \frac{1}{\ell}$ then graph K_ℓ can be supported by the gathering configuration in which each agent invites all others to a single gathering with rate $\frac{1}{\ell}$. \square

Proof of Fact 4.5. Let v denote the single node in $H_{k,1}$ that connects the two cliques of size k . If $1/k < \gamma < 1 - 1/k$, graph $H_{k,1}$ can be supported by having each node invite all of his neighbours to a single gathering with rate $1/k$. If $\gamma \geq 1 - 1/k$, we can instead support $H_{k,1}$ by having each node except v invite all of his neighbours to a single gathering with rate $1/(k-1)$, and v holds no gatherings. In either case, graph $H_{k,1}$ is supportable. On the other hand, if $\gamma \leq 1/k$, then it must be that $M_{v,u}^v < 1/k$ for all $u, v \in H_{k,1}$. Thus, since each pair of nodes in $H_{k,1}$ have at most $k-2$ common neighbours, it follows from Corollary 3.5 that $M_{v,u} < 1$ for all $u, v \in H_{k,1}$, and thus $H_{k,1}$ is not supportable.

For the more general case of $H_{k,p}$, let A and B denote the two disjoint cliques of size $k-p$, and let C denote the single clique of size p . Then $H_{k,p}$ can be supported by the gathering structure in which each $u \in A$ holds a gathering for $A \cup C$ at rate $1/(k-p)$ and each $v \in B$ holds a gathering for $B \cup C$ at rate $1/(k-p)$. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.6. Let $G = H_{3,2}$. See Figure 2(a) for an illustration of this graph, with a labeling of the vertices. We show that G is supportable by explicitly giving a stable gathering configuration. The invitation rates of this gathering configuration are illustrated in Figure 2(b), with the convention that a label on an edge (v_1, v_2) near vertex v_1 is $M_{v_1, v_2}^{v_1}$ (i.e. the rate at which v_1 invites v_2). Thus, for example, we have $M_{x,v}^x = \frac{1-\gamma}{2}$




Figure 2: Graph $H_{3,2}$ from the proof of Theorem 4.6. (a) A labeling of the vertices. (b) The invitation rates of a supporting gathering configuration, with the convention that a label on edge (v_1, v_2) near node v_1 represents $M_{v_1, v_2}^{v_1}$. (c) A labeling of the invitation rates used in the proof of Theorem 4.6.

and $M_{w,v}^w = \frac{1}{2}$. These invitation rates are realized through the configuration that nests gatherings, as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We encourage the reader to verify that this gathering structure is indeed stable when $\gamma > 1/2$, and that it supports graph $H_{3,2}$.

We now show that $H_{3,2}$ is not supportable when $\gamma \leq 1/2$. Suppose for contradiction that graph $H_{3,2}$ is supportable by a stable gathering configuration. We will show that $M_{u,v} > 1 - \gamma$, which contradicts Theorem 3.4 (since node u would have incentive to support a connection to node v). For ease of exposition, we will assign a variable to each of the ten different invitation rates in our graph; see Figure 2(c) for this labeling. So, for example, we will write q' for $M_{x,w}^x$.

Note first that, since $\gamma \leq 1/2$, it cannot be that any invitation rate is 0. This is because each of the four outer edges has only one common neighbour, so if any invitation rate is 0 then some edge is being supported by only two agents, which by Corollary 3.5 is not possible if $\gamma \leq 1/2$. It must therefore be that each invitation rate is precisely equal to the effort required to maintain the associated connec-

tion. In particular,

$$M_{x,w} = \min\{s, s'\} + \min\{t, t'\} + q + q' = 1. \quad (9)$$

We wish to give a lower bound on $M_{u,v}$, but this is complicated by the fact that $M_{u,v}^x$ and $M_{u,v}^w$ depend on the way that nodes x and w realize their invitation rates. We therefore consider separate cases depending on the values of the invitation rates for nodes x and w . **Case 1:** $q > p$ and $q > r$. Note that $M_{w,v}^x \leq q'$, and thus $q' + r + t \geq M_{w,v} = 1$. If it were the case that $t \leq t'$, we would conclude

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\leq q' + t + r < q' + t + q \\ &\leq q' + q + \min\{s, s'\} + \min\{t, t'\} = 1, \end{aligned}$$

contradicting (9). We must therefore have $t > t'$. By symmetry we can also conclude that $s > s'$. In the same way, if $q' > p'$ or $q' > r'$ we would conclude $s' > s$ or $t' > t$, a contradiction. It must therefore be that $q' \leq p'$ and $q' \leq r'$.

By symmetry we can assume $p' \leq r'$. We then claim that $M_{u,v} \geq p' + (p + r - q)$. This follows from Corollary 3.3: node v must be included in all gatherings held by node x , and hence $M_{u,v}^x = p'$; and node x must be part of all gatherings held by node w , so nodes u and v must be together in such gatherings with rate at least $p + r - q$, by inclusion-exclusion principle. Furthermore, since $s > s'$ and $t > t'$, (9) implies $q + q' + s' + t' = 1$. Finally, $q > p$ and $q > r$ implies $p + s' + p' = M_{x,u} = 1$ and $r + t' + r' = M_{x,v} = 1$. Putting this all together, we conclude

$$\begin{aligned} M_{u,v} &\geq p' + (p + r - q) = 1 - (r' - q') \\ &> 1 - r' > 1 - \gamma, \end{aligned}$$

as required, since each invitation rate is less than γ .

Case 2: $q' > p'$ and $q' > r'$. This implies $M_{u,v} > 1 - \gamma$ in the same way as Case 1.

Case 3: $q \leq \max\{p, r\}$ and $q' \leq \max\{p', r'\}$. We note that $q + s' + p' \geq M_{x,u} = 1$ and $q' + r + t \geq M_{w,v} = 1$, which implies $q + q' + s' + t > 1$ since $p' < \gamma \leq 1/2$ and $r < \gamma \leq 1/2$. Equation (9) therefore implies that we cannot have $s' \leq s$ and $t \leq t'$. Similarly, it cannot be that $s \leq s'$ and $t' \leq t$. We can then assume by symmetry that $s < s'$ and $t < t'$, so that (9) implies $q + q' + s + t = 1$.

We conclude by considering cases for p, r, p' , and q' . Suppose that $p \leq r$ and $p' \leq r'$. Recalling that $M_{u,v} = \min\{p, r\} + \min\{p', r'\}$, we then

have $M_{u,v} = p + p'$. Since

$$q' + p + s \geq M_{u,w} = 1 \quad (10)$$

and

$$q + p' + s' \geq M_{u,x} = 1, \quad (11)$$

we obtain

$$2 \leq q' + q + p + p' + s + s' = q + q' + s + s' + M_{u,v}.$$

Combined with $q + q' + s + t = 1$ and $s' < \gamma$, it follows that $M_{u,v} > 1 - \gamma$ as required. The cases for $p > r$ and/or $p' > r'$ are handled similarly, applying inequalities $q' + r + t \geq 1$ in place of (10) and $q + r' + t' \geq 1$ in place of (11) as appropriate. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.10. Let $n = |V|$ be the total community size. Write $k^* = \lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor + 1$. Split V into groups of k^* agents and denote these groups by A_1, \dots, A_m , where $m = n/k^*$. Now take i.i.d random subsets $X_i \subset V$ of size $K + 1 - \lfloor 1/\gamma \rfloor$ from the community. Define

$$Y_k = \bigcup_{i < k} \{v \in X_k : v \in X_i, (A_k \cup Y_k) \cap X_i \neq \emptyset\}$$

and $Z_k = X_k \setminus Y_k$. That is, the subsets Z_i are similar to the subsets X_i , but “fixed” so that no pair of agents appears in two different subsets. Now let each node in A_k invite $A_k \cup Z_k$ (except itself) with rate γ . By our definition of Z_k , the meeting rate for any two agents is either 0 or 1. This verifies that the configuration is stable. We now count the total degree D for the corresponding connection graph. Recalling that the meeting rate is either 0 or 1, we see $D = \sum_{k=1}^m (|Z_k| + k^* - 1)(|Z_k| + k^*)$. Note that, by the union bound,

$$\mathbb{E}Y_k \leq \gamma m \frac{K + 1}{n} \frac{(K + 1)^2}{n} = o(1).$$

This implies that with high probability, we have $|k \in [n] : Y_k \geq 1| = o(m)$. It then follows that with high probability

$$\begin{aligned} D &\geq (1 - o(1))mK(K + 1) \\ &= (1 - o(1))nK(K + 1)/k^*. \end{aligned}$$

This guarantees the existence of a K -supportable graph with the required average degree. \square

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